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Abstract
The Bush Doctrine is a suggested modification of international law that would
allow states to launch preventive military action in order to preclude terrorist
attacks or enemy strikes involving weapons of mass destruction. At present,
however, the Bush Doctrine is little more than a prescriptive notion as opposed to
a fully developed set of proposed legal rules. This article considers a series of
different rule explications and ancillary rules that would be necessary to give the
Bush Doctrine effect in law. Specifically, we consider: (1) What is the Threat
Threshold that Triggers the Doctrine?; (2) Who is Allowed to Authorize Action?;
(3) Must This Be a Last Resort Option?; (4) Must the Right be Exercised Multi-
laterally or is Unilateral Action Permitted?; (5) How Do the Laws of War Con-
strain Doctrine Actions?; and (6) What Mechanisms Exist for Ensuring
Compliance/Enforcement and to Punish Violations? The viability and implica-
tions of different answers to these questions are examined.
t Paul F. Diehl is Henning Larsen Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Shyam Kulkarni and Adam Irish are Ph.D. Candidates in
Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
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I. Introduction
The common refrain, "there ought to be a law," signals a preference for some
new proscription or prescription in the international or other legal systems. Yet
changing legal rules involves more than broadly specifying allowed or prohibited
behavior. There must also be a series of ancillary rules that establish qualifica-
tions about the behavior. Furthermore, additional rules must specify the
processes that provide for the orderly implementation and enforcement of the
central normative rule. Rules that provide issue-specific requirements about be-
havioral conduct can be referred to as part of the "normative system" of interna-
tional law. Working in tandem with normative requirements, the "operating
system" provides the framework for establishing rules and norms, outlines the
parameters of interaction, and provides the procedures and forums for resolving
disputes involving the norms.' It is the configuration of these supplemental rules
that determine the conditions under which a rule can be exercised, which actors
can exercise the rights or are constrained by the obligations of the new rule, and
how the new rule will be enforced and violations of the rule addressed.
In this article, we examine the so-called Bush Doctrine, or the "claim of au-
thority to use, unilaterally and without international authorization, high levels of
violence in order to arrest a development that is not yet operational and hence is
not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to mature, could be neutral-
ized only at a high, possibly unacceptable, cost." 2 An example of such an action
is the 1981 Israeli attack on the Osirek nuclear reactor in Iraq. Much of the
debate over the Bush Doctrine concerns whether it should or should not be (and
in a few cases whether it is or is not) international law. 3 The Doctrine is better
understood as a yet to be clearly defined right to use military force, rather than a
set of clear rules on its application. The rules chosen to constrain or channel this
right have substantial implications for how the Bush Doctrine would be exer-
cised, its frequency of use, and its effectiveness. Thus, a full evaluation of its
implications cannot be made without specifying and analyzing the ancillary rules
that might accompany a new rule for the use of military force.4
I See PAUL F. DIEHL & CHARLOTrE Ku, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 74-102 (2010).
2 W. Michael Reisman, Self Defense in an Age of Terrorism, 97 AM. Soc'v INT'L. L. PROc. 141, 143
(2003) (emphasis in original).
3 See Donna M. Davis, Preemptive War and the Legal Limits of National Security Policy, 10 lus
GENTIUM 11, 50-52 (2004); see also Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, The "Bush Doctrine": Can Pre-
ventative War be Justified?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 843, 865 (2009); see also Thomas R. Anderson,
Legitimizing the Gap Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL Y 261, 265-
67 (2010).
4 Another criterion for evaluating new rules is the degree to which they empirically fulfill their
purposes, that is their effectiveness. With respect to the Bush Doctrine, we use this standard in Paul F.
Diehl & Shyam Kulkarni, Worth a Pound of Cure?: An Empirical Assessment of the Bush Doctrine and
Preventive Military Action, U.MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L.REv. (forthcoming). Our general conclusion is
that using military force in a preventive fashion provides very limited, if any value, to states that employ
this strategy. At best, there is less than an even chance of victory in such circumstances and this requires
a full-scale war. The utility of preventive strikes diminishes tremendously in attacks short of war, and
indeed the minimal success rate (around 10%) is no better than using coercive diplomacy by merely
threatening force rather than actually using it. The success rate improves somewhat for major power
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Accordingly, we consider a series of rules that would be necessary to give the
Bush Doctrine effect in law. Specifically, we consider (1) What is the Threat
Threshold that Triggers the Doctrine?; (2) Who is Allowed to Authorize Action?;
(3) Must This Be a Last Resort Option?; (4) Must the Right be Exercised Multi-
laterally or is Unilateral Action Permitted?; (5) How Do the Laws of War Con-
strain Doctrine Actions?; and (6) What Mechanisms Exist for Ensuring
Compliance/Enforcement and to Punish Violations? We begin with a brief elab-
oration of the Bush Doctrine and describe the analytical framework that guides
our address of the six questions noted above.
II. The Basic Elements of the Bush Doctrine
The purported right of states to take preventive action is labeled with the name
of President George W. Bush, but his immediate predecessors each presented
policies that were consistent with the Bush Doctrine.5 Such justifications took
place in the context of specific threats against the U.S., but the resulting asser-
tions took the form of general American policy.
In light of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. developed a policy
in its September 2002 National Security Strategy that stated, "our best defense is
a good offense."6 The strategy further asserted that the U.S. would act prior to
any attack by stating, "we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise
our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent
them from doing harm against our people and our country."7
Less than six months later, U.S. President George W. Bush expanded the po-
tential targets of preventive actions to include enemy regimes that were pursuing
weapons of mass destruction, specifically Iraq:
Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when
have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us
on notice before they strike? If this threat is permitted to fully and sud-
denly emerge, all actions, all words, and all recriminations would come
too late.8
Bush Doctrine strikes are designed to take place before an attack occurs, but
there is no explicit benchmark on how likely the military attack would have to be
states, but not enough to justify the use of force or perhaps to overcome the establishment of a right that
only a limited set of actors can exercise.
5 Zhiyuan Cui, The Bush Doctrine and Neoconservatism: A Chinese Perspective, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 403, 403 (2005).
6 NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, The Nat'l Sec. Strategy of the United States of America (Sept. 2002),
pt. III, available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/. The idea of preventive
military actions or "anticipatory self-defense" predates Bush Administration policy and action, although
its prominence is more recent. See ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMF'TION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH
WAYS 1-55 (2006) (for a brief history in chapter 1). Note also that anticipatory self-defense is not
necessarily the only law based justification with respect to the invasion of Iraq. The United States and
others might have cited the Iraqi violation of the cease-fire agreement part of UN Resolution 687. See
DINSTEIN, infra note 77, at 215 for an elaboration of this argument.
7 NAT'L SECURITY COUNCIL, supra note 6, pt. 111.
8 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003).
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before a preventive action is justified - it could be weeks or years before a pro-
spective attack (these elements are discussed below). The purpose of Bush Doc-
trine actions is to foreclose an attack, and, therefore, negate the need for self-
defensive actions later on.
The legal rationale underlying the Bush Doctrine arises from the changing
character of warfare over time and the inadequacy of United Nations (U.N.)
Charter-based law to deal with these circumstances. Provisions in the U.N. Char-
ter dealing with the use of force, specifically Article 51,9 permit self-defense
actions, but only after an attack has occurred. They are predicated on the as-
sumption that the attack arises from another state; individuals and groups are
relevant only as subjects of legal protection during the use of military force. Yet,
in the last several decades, non-state actors such as armed militias and terrorist
groups have undertaken military operations, and they are increasingly well armed
and capable of launching widespread and destructive attacks.
Identifying responsible actors and their use of force is different than conven-
tional military attacks, and the standard rules do not seem to apply. Terrorist
attacks tend to be singular events such that conventional self-defense responses
are not feasible; there is no ongoing invasion or attack against which one can
respond. In such circumstances, laws of state responsibility dictate that the vic-
tim-state file a claim against the state where the attack originated or file against
secondary-state supporters of those perpetrating the acts.' 0 Yet states are not
responsible for actions of terrorist groups unless the former exercises "effective
control" over the latter. Most often, however, states do not support or have con-
trol over the groups operating within its borders. In the case of failed states,
there might be no legitimate authority against which a claim might be directed.
This presumes that the geographic origin of the terrorist attack can even be deter-
mined; in fact, the planning, financial support, and execution might involve mul-
tiple states and may not be transparent. Furthermore, terrorist groups do not have
legal status to have a claim made against them directly, even in the unlikely event
that they would honor such legal responsibilities. The deterrent effect from tradi-
tional self-defense may not be applicable or credible against non-state actors and,
therefore, the non-state actors are not likely to be restrained in their actions. As
such, preventive action is necessary where deterrence will not work.
In addition, Charter-based self-defense provisions are inadequate in cases of
attack involving weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear attack could conceiva-
bly wipe out a victim state's military forces or government structures, such that
the ability to launch self-defense actions is precluded. As W. Michael Reisman
explains:
The introduction of vastly more destructive and rapidly delivered weap-
ons began to undercut the cogency of that [UN Charter] legal regime.
The reason was simple: a meaningful self-defense could be irretrievably
9 U.N. Charter art. 51, para 1.
10 CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 121-24 (3rd ed. 2008); see also
Richard N. Gardner, Neither Bush nor the "Jurisprudes", 97 Am. J. INT'L L. 585, 590 (2003).
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lost if an adversary with much more destructive weapons and poised to
attack had to initiate (in effect, accomplish) its attack before a right of
self-defense came into operation."
In the case of geographically small states such as Israel, a large portion of its
society would be destroyed following a nuclear attack. The magnitude of the
harm is so great that waiting for attack is unreasonable. Most analogous, how-
ever, is the precautionary principle, which is notably applied in environmental
and other areas of law.12 According to this principle, the mere prospect of signif-
icant harm, especially of great magnitude and irreversible effects, is sufficient
justification for government action.' 3 Uncertainty, or the probability of an event
occurring, must be weighed in comparison to the magnitude of the harm. When
catastrophic harm is possible (e.g., effects of global warming), the presumption is
tilted in favor of action rather than inaction. Such logic has even been directly
applied to the Bush Doctrine where political figures have used rhetoric consistent
with the precautionary principle in justifying preventive strikes and scholars have
looked at terrorism and nuclear war in the context of catastrophic risk.' 4
Various arguments in support of the Bush Doctrine as accepted international
law involve rationales based on instant custom,' 5 jus cogens,16 and opinion ne-
cessitates.'7 Nevertheless, there is little indication that the Bush Doctrine is pres-
ently accepted law or practice. State practice with respect to anticipatory self-
defense has been so rare, indicating that traditional custom has not been estab-
lished, nor have the conditions that would make established international law
been fulfilled.' 8
In the absence of established law, as specified in a treaty or customary prac-
tice, there is little guide to the precise elements of what any international rule
might encompass. With respect to the Bush Doctrine, the central prescription is
that military force could be exercised in a preventive fashion, but there is little
beyond that. For the Bush Doctrine to function as law, a series of additional
rules are required that provide the parameters of the allowed behavior - i.e., the
preventive use of military force - and how those behaviors will be managed in
11 Reisman, supra note 2, at 142-43.
12 James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law
and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & ComP. L. REv. 1, 3 (1991).
See generally CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
13 See generally Cameron & Abouchar, supra note 12; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12.
14 See Jessica Stern & Jonathan Wiener, Precaution Against Terrorism, 1-58 (Harvard Univ. Faculty
Research, Working Paper No. 019, 2006).
15 Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush Doctrine Became Law After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 156 (2003); see also Lucy Martinez,
September 1lth, Iraq and the Doctrine of Anticipatory Self Defense, 72 UMKC L. REV., 123, 190 (2003).
16 David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Mark Wendell DeLaquil, War, International Law, and
Sovereignty: Reevaluating the New Century Preemption and Law in the Twenty First Century, 5 CI. J.
INT'L L. 467 (2005).
17 Christian M. Henderson, The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States: The Pre-Emp-
tive Use of Force and the Persistent Advocate, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 28 (2007).
18 David A. Sadoff, Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense, 40
GEO. J. INT'L L. 423, 583 (2009).
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the international legal system. Following Paul Diehl and Charlotte Ku, we refer
to these as normative and operating systems rules respectively.19
III. Normative System v. Operating System Rules
Transforming the Bush Doctrine from a vague policy proposal to a more pre-
cise rule of international law will require a series of decisions that provide greater
specificity about the conditions under which preventive military action is al-
lowed. This is part of what is referred to as the normative system of international
law. International law as a normative system provides direction for international
relations by identifying the substantive values and goals to be pursued. The Bush
Doctrine will also require operational elements that outline the parameters of
interaction and provide the procedures and forums for resolving disputes among
those taking part in these interactions. Any rule of law must be properly speci-
fied normatively, but must also be compatible with the operating system struc-
tures and processes that give it effect. We discuss the normative and operating
system elements in more detail below as a prelude to covering the key elements
that are required for the Bush Doctrine.
In defining the normative system, the participants in the international legal
process engage in a political and legislative exercise that defines the substance
and scope of the law. Normative change may occur slowly with evolution of
customary practices, a traditional source of international law. Yet, in recent his-
torical periods, normative change has been precipitated by new treaties (e.g., the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) or by a series of actions by international orga-
nizations (e.g., the activities of the first team of U.N. weapons inspectors in Iraq).
The Bush Doctrine could logically come to fruition under either process, but one
might expect that evolutionary practice, especially one defined by more rapid
customary practice,2 0 is more likely than codification of the rule in a multilateral
treaty. In any case, the establishment of international legal norms is still less
precise and structured than in domestic legal systems where formal deliberative
bodies enact legislation.
The topics of the normative system are issue-specific, and many components
of the system refer to subtopics within issue areas (e.g., the status of women
within the broader topic area of human rights). 21 Many of these issues have long
been on the agenda of international law. In fact, proscriptions on the use of
military force have their roots in natural law and early Christian teachings on just
war. 2 2 Many normative rules concerning the law of the sea (e.g., seizure of com-
mercial vessels during wartime) also have long pedigrees in customary prac-
19 DEIHL & Ku, supra note 1, at 74-102 (elaborating on the normative and operating systems).
20 Anthea Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Recon-
ciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 759 (2001).
21 See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
783, 788-90 (2006); see also Christopher C. Joyner, The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Con-
cern and the Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 708-09 (2007) (contending the
U.N. Charter establishes international obligations to protect not only people but sub-groups such as wo-
men and children).
22 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22-24 (6th ed. 2008).
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tice.23 Yet, recent trends in the evolution of the normative system represent
expansions in its scope and depth. Some current issue areas of international legal
concern, most notably with respect to human rights and the environment, have
developed almost exclusively during the latter half of the twentieth century. Fur-
thermore, within issue areas, legal norms have sought to regulate a wider range
of behaviors. For example, international law on the environment has evolved
beyond simple concerns of riparian states to include concerns with ozone deple-
tion, water pollution, and other problems. 24
With respect to the Bush Doctrine, specifying the normative element means
not only allowing preventive military action as a norm or value of the interna-
tional community, but also providing clarity and detail on what kinds of military
actions are permitted, the conditions that must be present for the actions to be
legal, and how the actions relate to other rules of international law. Below, we
address the different options available to answer these concerns.
The operating system deals with a different series of concerns or questions.
Who, for example, are the authorized decision-makers in international law?
Whose actions can bind not only the parties involved but also others? How do
we know that an authoritative decision has taken place? When does the resolu-
tion of a conflict or a dispute give rise to new law? The operating system may be
associated with formal structures, but not all operating system elements are insti-
tutional. For example, the Vienna Convention on Treaties entails no institutional
mechanisms, but it does specify various operational rules about treaties and
therefore the parameters of lawmaking. 2 5
The operating system has a number of dimensions or components that are
typically covered in international law textbooks but largely unconnected to one
another. 2 6 Some of the primary components include: (1) the sources of law, (2)
actors, (3) jurisdiction, and (4) courts or institutions. 27 The operating system
then is a set of rules that govern how international law is made, which actors
have rights and obligations, how legal processes are managed, and which struc-
tures are assigned tasks with respect to dispute resolution and compliance. If
there are not suitable operating system procedures available, then norms in the
legal system are likely to be ineffective in promoting the desired behaviors. New
23 The Paquete Habana, The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 708-09 (1900).
24 PETER M. HAAS, ROBERT 0. KEOHANE & MARC A. LEVY, INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES
OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 27-29, (1993); DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COL-
LAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE STRUGGLE TO SLOw GLOBAL WARMING 13-15 (2004); Ronald
B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty Compliance, 48(3) INT'L ORG.
425, 430-33, 458 (1994).
25 See United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 3-5, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 thereinafter Vienna Convention].
26 Shaw, supra note 22 at, 62-64.
27 Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54(3) INT'L
ORG., 421, 424-26; see generally Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary International law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757 (2001); see also Jose Alvarez,
The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 218-32 (2002) (discussing the emergence
and role of international organizations); see also Steve Charnovitz, Nongovernmental Organizations and
International Law, 100 AM.J. INT'L L. 348, 359-62 (2006) (discussing the impact of Non-Governmental
Organizations on international law).
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norms, such as the Bush Doctrine, can rely on extant processes created for gen-
eral purposes - like, for example, the role that the International Court of Justice
plays for any question of international law, regardless of issue area, which consti-
tutes a dispute between state parties. States might also create norm or issue area
specific institutions or processes, such as the WTO dispute resolution mechanism
that exists for trade conflicts. 28
With respect to the Bush Doctrine, concerns with defining what constitutes
law or not, as well as jurisdictional elements (e.g., national vs. universal jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters), are largely irrelevant. Yet, which actors can exercise
the right to preventive military action and which actors can decide (with which
legal processes) is fundamental to the operation of a new Bush Doctrine precept.
In addition, the Bush Doctrine must include provisions for how disputes over its
usage are settled, how violators are punished, and what remedies are available to
those that are victims of abuse of the new rights granted by the Bush Doctrine.
Below, we address these vital elements.
In the following section, we present and analyze different options or variations
for key elements of normative and operating system components of the Bush
Doctrine. We cover these not by system category, but rather by the sequence in
which they would be carried out in practice, namely authorization, execution, and
enforcement.
IV. Key Elements of a Prospective Bush Doctrine
Any Doctrine or legal right must be constrained or channeled through rules on
its application. In order to analyze the rules that could apply to the Bush Doc-
trine, we divide the process of applying the Bush Doctrine into three analytical
phases: authorization, execution and enforcement. In analyzing the authorization
phase, we examine the threshold that might trigger the right, the actors that might
hold authority over the right, and the right's status relative to other legal reme-
dies. Considering the execution phase, we investigate the actors that might actu-
ally conduct a preventive act and how those acts are constrained by the laws of
war. Finally, we question what mechanisms exist to ensure compliance/enforce-
ment and to punish violations.
A. Authorization
1. What is the Threat Threshold That Triggers the Doctrine?
The first step for any rule of law permitting a given behavior is to specify the
conditions under which the action is applicable and when the right can be exer-
cised. This is a part of the normative system in that the prescribed behavior is
conditioned by additional rules that define not only what actions are permitted,
but also the context in which they are permitted. For example, the right to with-
draw from treaties can only be exercised according to the provisions specified in
28 See Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/whatise/tif e/disple.htm (last visited April 16, 2011) (explaining the WTO's dispute resolu-
tion process).
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the treaty itself or those noted in applicable articles of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties. 29 With respect to the Bush Doctrine, this involves detailing when pre-
ventive military action might be allowed, as even the most liberal interpretations
of the doctrine do not regard unconditional military action as allowable. Because
Bush Doctrine action is designed to address a future threat, international legal
rules should ideally address two dimensions of that threat in delimiting its usage:
severity and timing.
In terms of the severity dimension, ideal international legal rules would desig-
nate the seriousness of the threat necessary before preventive action might be
permitted. Threats to national security range from the most extreme existential
threats to those that would involve limited damage or costs to the state. The U.N.
Charter and its rules on self-defense do not differentiate between different levels
of severity providing that an actual attack has occurred (more on the timing ele-
ment below). Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states, "[niothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Secur-
ity Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security."so
An armed attack might involve a wide range of activities, from those that are
minor threats to the state and its material well being, such as a border incursion
involving a limited number of troops, to those that are far more serious, such as a
full-scale invasion designed to conquer territory. According to the Charter stan-
dard, any act of aggression justifies the use of force in response. The U.N. defi-
nition of aggression, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in a 1975
resolution, sought to provide a list of unacceptable uses of military force. 31
These include not merely threats of force, but the actual uses of force to include
invasions, aerial bombardments, blockades, and allowing irregular forces to use
one's territory to launch attacks against another state.
The U.N. Charter standard sets a relatively low bar as any kind of military
attack can trigger a self-defense response. It is also one that is relatively easy to
assess in practice given that the attack has already occurred and that such military
action will be transparent. Setting a severity standard for the Bush Doctrine is
not as simple, given that an assessment of the threat is prospective.
At one extreme, one could adopt a rule that permits anticipatory self-defense
via the Bush Doctrine on the same grounds as the U.N. Charter. That is, any
prospective military attack would allow the potential victim to take preventive
action. Adopting the Charter standard, however, encounters a number of risks
and potential disadvantages for the international community. How does one
know that an armed attack is likely from an opponent? States regularly under-
take military planning and deployment of troops based on various contingencies,
29 Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 54, 56; Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV.
1579, 1588-91 (2005).
30 U.N. Charter art. 51, para. 1.
31 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp No. 19, U.N. Doc A/9619, at 142-144
(Dec. 14, 1974).
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such as the occurrence of a civil war in a neighboring state. For example, U.S.
and NATO plans for attacking Libyan air defenses existed for many years prior
to the outbreak of civil war in Libya in 2011. States make such plans regularly
against their rivals, and indeed possibly against allies who might undergo regime
change or alter their foreign policy orientations. Allowing preventive military
action in such cases would open the door for frequent and numerous military
actions in the global community, potentially turning every rivalry into armed
hostilities, which is precisely what the U.N. Charter and the Bush Doctrine desire
to preclude. In the post-cold war period, there have been approximately 290
serious rivalries in which enemies repeatedly threaten one another. 3 2 Thus, the
risk of escalation to full-scale war would be great, as victims of Bush Doctrine
actions could cite Charter rules for self-defense to respond in kind. States would
be given license to use military force rather than be required to seek peaceful
resolution to resolve disputes, an outcome in direct contradiction to Article 2,
Section 4 of the Charter: "All Members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."3 3
Might these problems be addressed by requiring a specific verbal threat to use
force before the Bush Doctrine could be operative? This eliminates the misinter-
pretation or exploitation of regularized and purely defensive actions by an oppo-
nent, but it is far from an ideal solution itself. Threats to use military force are
quite frequent, 34 and indeed are often a bargaining strategy for actors who seek to
have opponents back down in a dispute. 35 It is also the case that such threats are
frequently bluffs or "cheap talk," and there is no intention to actualize them. 3 6
For example, North Korea has regularly threatened to go to war with South Ko-
rea and other countries in the region over a wide range of slights (e.g. economic
sanctions, withholding of food aid), and such threats have never been brought to
fruition. Encouraging preventive military actions in the face of verbal threats is
likely to produce many instances of military action that are not actually
necessary.
Because of the problems attendant to encouraging preventive military actions
for any potential threats, some analysts have argued that the Bush Doctrine
should be applicable only to those threats that cross a threshold at the other end
of the continuum - existential threats and other catastrophic risks.37 This would
32 Paul F. Diehl, Gary Goertz & James P. Klein, The New Rivalry Dataset: Procedures and Patterns,
43 J. PEACE RESEARCH 331, 340 (2006).
33 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
34 Stuart Bremer, Faten Ghosn & Glenn Palmer, The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Cod-
ing Rules and Description, 21 CONFLICT MGMT. AND PEACE ScI. 133, 135-36 (2004).
35 See generally James Fearon, Rationalist Explanation for War, 49(3) INT'L ORG. 379 (1995).
36 Id.; Robert F. Trager, Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters, 104 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 347 (2010).
37 Gary Ackerman & William Potter, Catastrophic Nuclear Terrorism: A Preventable Risk in
GLOBAL CATASTROPHIC RISK 441 (Nick Bostrom, Milan M. irkovid eds., 2008); see also RICHARD
POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 89-91 (Oxford University Press 2004); Matthew C. Wax-
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significantly restrict the range of cases in which preventive military action might
be used, generally consistent with international community values that attempt to
make military force the exception, rather than the norm, for international
interaction.
Unlike an armed attack, which has clear and observable elements, detecting
future threats is complex and requires accurate intelligence and assessment. Such
estimations must be made of both an opponent's capabilities and its intent to use
those capabilities. If we restrict the scope of the threats to those involving mas-
sive destruction, at present there are only nine states that have nuclear weapons
capability.38 Most of these are unlikely candidates for "first use" of such weap-
ons. One could expand the permissiveness range of the Bush Doctrine to include
those states that are in the process of acquiring nuclear weapons, perhaps in con-
travention to international treaty obligations. This was one of the bases for Is-
raeli strikes against Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities in 1981 and 2007
respectively, actions consistent with the Bush Doctrine. The detection of chemi-
cal weapons capability is more complex, given (a) that many dangerous com-
pounds (e.g., VX gas) can be hidden in small places, and (b) chemical weapons
can be created quickly from the combination of two or more benign and permit-
ted compounds. Nuclear and chemical capabilities of terrorist groups are even
more problematic to determine, given the absence of specific target locations
(e.g., nuclear processing facility) associated with those groups and the shadowy
character of such groups relative to states.
Determining intent to use weapons is even more problematic than assessing
capabilities. The U.N. Charter standard avoids this problem by requiring an ac-
tual attack. States and terrorist groups do not publicly announce their intent to
use weapons at a specific time or place, because even if such intent exists, there
are clear tactical and strategic advantages not to signal actions in advance. Thus,
intelligence analysts would need to make a probability estimate of whether a state
or group will use its weapons capability and against which targets. Again, there
is room for error, most seriously on the side of overestimation of the threat as
Bush Doctrine rules are created. Rules permitting preventive military action can-
not solve the problem of "false negatives" (not taking action when the threat was
real), but might encourage "false positives" (taking military action when none
was necessary).39 Of course, as the 2003 invasion of Iraq indicated, accurate
intelligence about the existence of weapons of mass destruction and the intent to
use them is not always present, and there is a great risk of mistakes, the conse-
quences of which can be quite severe. Nevertheless, it seems best that the Bush
man, The Use of Force Against States that Might Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1, 6-15 (2009); see also MICHAEL W. DOYLE, STRIKING FIRST: PREEMPTION AND PREVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 25-30 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2008).
38 United States, France, United Kingdom, China, Russia, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea
(not including states engaged in nuclear weapons sharing via NATO).
39 The ideas behind the statistical principles of false positives and false negatives are explained in
RICHARD BINGHAM & CLAIRE FELBINGER, EVALUATION IN PRACTICE 11 (2002) and ROBERT P. ABELSON,
STATISTICS AS A PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT 104-30 (1995). Ideas of false positives and false negatives are
also commonly referred to as Type I and Type It errors, respectively. With respect to the Iraq invasion,
the point was made in HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 55-274 (2004).
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Doctrine be limited to a narrow set of threat levels - those in which the conse-
quences of the threat being carried out are significant.
A second element of the threat threshold is timing of the threat. There are
different standards available for the timing of permitted military action in inter-
national law, depending on whether the threat has been actualized in the form of
an attack, is imminent but not yet actually carried out, or might be actualized at
some specified time in the future. As noted above, the U.N. Charter provisions
allow military actions only after an actual attack has occurred. Another set of
timing rules, specific to anticipatory self-defense, was laid out in the Caroline
affair. This dates back to 1837 and involved British forces that seized and
burned a vessel in American waters that was preparing to transport men and
material to rebellious forces in Canada. The United States protested these actions
and U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster laid out a famous set of conditions
before preemptory military actions were permitted, specifically, the "necessity of
self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation." 40 This declaration has been widely cited and repeated over the
last two centuries, but it is not clear that customary practice has given it weight as
international law. The Caroline criteria permit military action only immediately
before an attack occurs, as soon as indications are such that an attack is immi-
nent. Although an exact point cannot be determined, one might presume that the
window is again quite narrow - it could be as little as hours and no longer than
days or a week.
Timing issues are more complex with respect to the Bush Doctrine. Defensive
strikes occur before an attack occurs, but this could be weeks or years before a
prospective attack and there is no explicit benchmark on how likely the military
attack would have to be before a preventive action is justified. Power transition
theorists project that China will surpass the U.S. in material capabilities some-
time in the middle 21st century and such a transition point has been associated
with major power war in the past, initiated by the rising state.4 1 Taking this as a
cue, preventive action could extend back 40 years from the possible attack as
well as any time up to the actual attack.
Allowing preventive military action well in advance of a threat being actual-
ized carries with it a number of risks. First, there is the strong potential for states
to mistakenly identify threats. By allowing action only in close temporal proxim-
ity to the threat, the Charter and Caroline standards offer much less prospect for
"false positives" in terms of future attacks. Intelligence estimates (as with any
kind of forecasting) become less accurate as the time between the assessment and
the prospective event increases. One only has to look at the best-selling book
from early 1990s about a then purported threat to the U.S. - The Coming War
40 William C. Fray & Lisa A. Spar, British-American Diplomacy The Caroline Case, THE AVALON
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19thcentury/br-1842d.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
41 Douglas Lemke & Ronald L. Tammen, Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China, 29 INT'L
INTERACTIONs 269, 270 (2003); Ronald Tammen & Jacek Kugler, Power Transition and China-US Con-
flicts, 1 CHINESE J. INT'L POL. 35, 45 (2006); see also STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE U.S., AND POWER
TRANSITION THEORY: A CRITIQUE 2 (2008).
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with Japan4 2 - to see that many such claims look ridiculous in retrospect. Any
long-term forecast is subject to error because of the presence of subsequent inter-
vening factors that might mitigate the threat. These include changes in regime
and, therefore, the policies of potential opponents, or the rise of new international
norms and institutions that prevent threats from being carried out.
Long-term forecasts are also open to substantial abuse given that any state in a
rivalry can argue that it will be subject to future attack at sometime from its
opponent. In actuality, many interstate rivalries never involve full-scale war or
advanced military confrontations; 43 nonetheless, states actively plan as if such
confrontations were commonplace. It is easy to envision various states using a
variety of excuses to justify the launching of military attacks against an opponent
in the absence of manifest indicators. Creating liberal rules on timing might cre-
ate more incidences of military attacks than it would prevent.
The creation of international rules on the timing element also must be consis-
tent with rules on other dimensions. For example, a provision that preventive
military actions could only be used as a last resort (see below) might be incom-
patible with one that permits action far in advance of the actualized threat. With
an extended time period available for peaceful solutions, it might be all but im-
possible to conclude that diplomacy has irrevocably failed. A few failures early
in the conflict resolution process do not signal that the outlook is hopeless. We
know that mediation and other efforts often fail repeatedly before some progress
is made or a resolution is reached.44 Thus, states might wrongly conclude that
some initial failures at diplomacy are suitable justification for moving ahead with
preventive military action.
In sum, there are significant problems with allowing preventive military ac-
tions far in advance of when an opponent might attack. However, the optimal
time point for preventive military actions is not clear. It must be somewhat ear-
lier than what is allowed by the Caroline criteria or the necessity for Bush Doc-
trine would be moot. Yet, more than a year in advance seems unduly lenient.
Greater clarity in terms of rule formation is apparent when deciding on the sever-
ity standard. There, it appears that normative rules would confine Bush Doctrine
actions to threats involving mass or extensive destruction, including catastrophic
risks.
2. Who is Allowed to Authorize Action?
A second consideration in rule construction focuses on who decides when the
conditions like those outlined above are manifest and, therefore, preventive mili-
tary action is justified. Who can make decisions concerning when rights can be
42 GEORGE FRIEDMAN & MEREDITH LEBARD, THE COMING WAR WITH JAPAN xiii-xiv (1992).
43 Diehl et. al., supra note 32, at 335. For example, the US-USSR rivalry never experienced direct
war.
44 Jacob Bercovitch & Paul F. Diehl, Conflict Management of Enduring Rivalries: The Frequency,
Timing, and Short-term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT'L INTERACTIONs 299, 317 (1997); James A. Wall,
Jr., et. al., Mediation: A Current Review and Theory Development, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 370, 385
(2001).
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exercised is fundamental to the legal operating system; a priori, who decides
whether a preventive military action meets the specified normative conditions,
whatever those standards might be? Operating system rules could allow the deci-
sion to rest solely in the hands of individual state actors at the one extreme or
there could be a requirement for approval by some quasi-judicial or political en-
tity at the international level.
Among scholars who have discussed the potential application of a Bush Doc-
trine, there have been many different potential authorizing agents. States may be
allowed to authorize themselves when they feel a sufficient threat, 4 5 or the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) could authorize action. There is also
the possibility for the creation of a new structure within the international operat-
ing system. Thomas R. Anderson suggested the creation of a new international
tribunal called the International Court of Threat Assessment. 46
If the goal is to create a rule in which the Bush Doctrine will be used fre-
quently, it would be easiest to allow states to invoke the Bush Doctrine any time
that they perceive a threat. This is consistent with many extant operating system
procedures that give primacy to state sovereignty and decision-making. For ex-
ample, the Charter provisions for self-defense allow states to launch necessary
military actions, although unilateral execution of defensive military action is per-
mitted only until the Security Council takes appropriate action.4 7 Scholars like
Robert J. Delahunty and John Yoo have argued that the U.S. should be allowed
to use force legally for both preventive self-defense and humanitarian missions; 48
this suggests a rule that international law should afford states such discretion.
This might be a realistic position given that states are the ones who write the
rules for themselves and there is always the expectation that the operating system
will provide for post hoc judgments on the legality of decisions (see below).
Allowing states discretion to act when they perceive a threat would allow them
to invoke the principle any time it might be needed, but also renders considerable
potential to increase the amount of global conflict. If states are allowed to be
their own arbiters, they may invoke the Bush Doctrine in situations when the
perceived threat does not warrant preventive action. Indeed, the philosopher
John Locke aptly noted "it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own
cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on
the other side that ill-nature, passion, and revenge will carry them too far in
punishing others." 49 States have historically misused current self-defense per-
missions, so it is unlikely that they would be any more judicious with the Bush
Doctrine.50 As Thomas Franck has observed, "wars continue to occur, as they
45 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 849.
46 Anderson, supra note 3, at 285.
47 U.N. Charter art. 51.
48 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 848.
49 THE LocKE READER 282 (John W. Yolton ed., 1977).
50 For instance, Adolf Hitler justified the German invasion of Poland in 1939 using the principle of
self-defense. In fact, German soldiers staged an attack on a German radio outpost to provide the pretext
of self-defense.
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have since time immemorial, with parties both of which are using force allegedly
in 'self-defense.' "51 Even if states did not abuse the right to invoke the Bush
Doctrine, states may have very different perceptions of threat, creating another
potential source of concern. Additionally, states that previously experienced hos-
tilities may be more likely to invoke the Bush Doctrine in the future. 52
If states cannot be trusted as authorizing agents for their own Bush Doctrine
actions, some sort of international authorization process must be specified. Do-
ing so would also confer additional legitimacy upon the Bush Doctrine,53 espe-
cially should the procedural requirements for using the Bush Doctrine be
exceptionally stringent. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), already
an established part of the operating system, has been suggested as a logical body
for approving preventive military actions. 5 4
The UNSC is already permitted to authorize action in collective self-defense.
Although a codification of the Bush Doctrine may make the UNSC more willing
to consider it explicitly, political, not legal, considerations have made the authori-
zation by the Security Council extremely rare. Each of the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council - the U.S., Russia, China, France and the United
Kingdom - can exercise a veto on an authorization of force. Therefore, unless
there is consensus among these five states (and an affirmative vote of nine Coun-
cil members), it is impossible for the UNSC to act.
Since its inception, the UNSC has only authorized collective self-defense
twice. In the first case, the Korean War, the Nationalists represented China and
the Soviet Union boycotted the authorizing vote; neither is likely to be repeated.
The second case involved the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, which occurred
after a brief moment of great power consensus following the end of the Cold
War. Perhaps more relevant is the willingness of the UNSC to approve the use of
military action by member states to redress a range of different problems. Fa-
mously, the Council did not approve U.S. and British action in Iraq prior to the
second Gulf War, but it did give its stamp of approval to take military action in
Haiti and Libya respectively, using the euphemism "all necessary means/mea-
sures" to give states the green light to take military action.55 Yet, these latter
circumstances were far from those envisioned by the Bush Doctrine. The pres-
ence of repressive regimes and humanitarian concerns motivated the UNSC
members to allow military force. Still, there is no right or obligation for the
51 Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 811 (1970).
52 Michael Skopets, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of Self-De-
fense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 753, 780 (2006) (explaining justification for preventative
force); Onder Bakircioglu, The Right to Self-Defence in National and International Law: The Role of the
Imminence Requirement, 19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009).
53 Anderson, supra note 3, at 263.
54 Martinez, supra note 15, at 191; Matthew C. Waxman, The Use of Force Against States that Might
Have Weapons of Mass Destruction, 31 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 30 (2009).
55 See S.C. Res. 940, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (July 31, 1994) (approving action in Haiti); see also
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Approves 'No-Fly Zone' Over Libya, Authorizing 'All
Necessary Measures' to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Re-
lease SC/10200 (March 17, 2011).
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international community to intervene for humanitarian concerns ("responsibility
to protect"), 56 and in other instances of humanitarian emergencies, the UNSC
chose not to grant authorization for military action (e.g., Darfur). Thus, the
Council would be less willing to approve preventive action against uncertain and
future threats. Whereas allowing individual states to decide actions might lead to
an excess of military actions, placing that authority in the hands of the UNSC
would likely produce the opposite outcome: few actions and some missed
opportunities.
If existing operating system structures are flawed, an alternative is the creation
of a new institution tailored to the needs of the Bush Doctrine. Anderson's Inter-
national Court of Threat Assessment (ICTA) is such a body.5 7 In his conception,
the ICTA would:
(1) be non-adversarial, (2) be non-public in its proceedings, (3) have a
large pool of impartial judges from which petitioning states may choose,
(4) possess special competencies in strategic intelligence assessment, (5)
offer only advisory opinions, (6) possess a widely-accepted set of criteria
for authorizing prophylactic self-defense, and (7) be a court of last
resort.58
By creating a court that could operate apolitically and in secret, hearing only
the appeals of threatened states, the ICTA has the potential to constrain the most
egregious abuses and, potentially, promote efficient uses of the Bush Doctrine for
the public good. Moreover, by centralizing the analysis of sensitive intelligence
and creating a large pool of judges, advocates for ICTA contend that states can
more securely outline actions they are considering taking under the Bush Doc-
trine. 5 9 Despite these aspirations, twin tensions bind the ICTA and, in our assess-
ment, make it unlikely that an ICTA would be able to accomplish its purported
goals without sacrificing either the legitimacy or the caseload of the court.
On the one hand, to function efficiently and with the trust of plaintiff states the
ICTA would necessarily need to be secret.6 0 Judges and their staff would deal
with sensitive intelligence on developing threats - information that states jeal-
ously guard. Additionally, given the severity of the threats and potential re-
sponses that plaintiff states might propose, it would be impossible to have the
target states or other actors represented before the court. To do so would tip the
targets off to the intelligence gathered, as well as the security concerns and po-
tential responses of the plaintiff states.61
56 See Joyner, supra note 21, at 696; Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem
of Military Intervention, 84 INT'L AFF. 615, 615 (2008).
57 Anderson, supra note 3, at 263.
58 Id. at 285-90.
59 Id. at 287.
60 Id. at 286-87.
61 An analogy in municipal law can be made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
which authorizes surveillance of potential spies in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (FISA). FISC operates in secrecy, with the subjects of investigations only being notified after the
fact. Were the government to notify potential spies in advance, that would cause them to flee, conceal
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On the other hand, for the ICTA to function as intended, it must garner broad
recognition and approval within the international community. In order for plain-
tiff states to take the step of case referral (as opposed to deciding on action uni-
laterally), they would need some assurance that a favorable ICTA ruling will help
them make their case in the public domain. The ability of the ICTA to attain
such reputational capital is complicated by the secret, one-sided character of
cases that would be considered. One way to remedy this problem might be to
include judges from a diversity of states and to limit the ability of the plaintiffs to
choose their judges. This may persuade the international community that, even if
they are not privy to the cases, they can reasonably assume that garnering ap-
proval of the court will require winning over at least some skeptical judges.
Unfortunately, these requirements for secrecy and legitimacy work against one
another, and any movement one way or the other is likely to exacerbate the
problems of legitimacy or case referral. If a plaintiff state is allowed to pick its
panel of judges, then the ICTA is unlikely to ever gain legitimacy in the interna-
tional community. Given plaintiff state concerns of privacy and maintaining the
military advantage of surprise, solutions such as including a judge from the target
state or a target state ally are unavailable in this context because they would
effectively discourage plaintiff states from appealing to the ICTA. The problem
of driving plaintiff states away reappears if those states are not allowed to pick
their judges. From a purely logistical perspective, no state is going to turn over
valuable intelligence without knowing who will be privy to it. Once plaintiff
states are notified of their draw from the judicial pool and are unsatisfied with it,
what is to stop a plaintiff state from refusing to proceed in turning over their
intelligence or even naming the target state?
For the sake of argument, let us assume that this problem of judge selection is
somehow overcome. Even if an ICTA existed that could credibly commit to both
plaintiff and target states that rulings would be impartial and secret, a filtering
effect would still exist on the cases that they would likely receive. All threats
might presumably meet the high severity threshold specified above, but cases
could vary according to the uncertainty surrounding the likelihood the threat
would be carried out as well as the probability that the plaintiffs preventive
action would be successful.
The cases about which ICTA advocates are most concerned - high uncer-
tainty, low probability of winning - might never make it to the ICTA because of
their actions, or otherwise move ahead with their criminal activities. Thus, the secrecy is justified, de-
spite the lack of democratic accountability associated with it. There are a few differences between FISA
and a potential court assessing the Bush Doctrine. States in the international system are not given the
same right to privacy that individuals enjoy, nor would an international court likely have as much ability
to acquire information on potential rogue states. Regardless, the general logic requiring secrecy applies
to both the FISA situation and a potential court evaluating the Bush Doctrine. For articles discussing the
tension, see generally Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Walls (And Wires) Have Ears: The Background and
First Ten Years of the Foreign Surveillance Act of 1978, 137. U. PA. L. REV. 793 (1988-1989); see also
Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The D.C. Circuit and The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380 (1992) (discussing the tension between secrecy and notification);
see also Nola K. Breglio, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance 113 YALE L.J. 179 (2003) (reappraising the context of FISA after the passing of the USA
PATRIOT act).
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a plaintiff state's fear of the reputational damage from losing. This is a desirable
outcome if the effect is also to deter the plaintiff state from launching the preven-
tive attack. Unfortunately, cases at the other extreme -low uncertainty and high
probability of winning - are also unlikely to appear before the ICTA either be-
cause states might not want to risk an unfavorable ruling in the face of a near-
certain threat that could be eliminated. As the severity of the threat increases, the
risk and the tendency to bypass the court will also increase. It is exactly these
cases that could most bolster an ICTA's reputation by affording the body the
opportunity to support a justified case.
The cases most likely to make it to our imagined impartial and secret ICTA
would be murkier cases in which the evidence of the threat is less compelling or
the case for effective preventive action is less convincing. In either event, the
ICTA would likely risk its own reputation. Rejecting a proposed action that is
then undertaken by the plaintiff anyway carries the risk of making the court seem
irrelevant. Meanwhile, supporting a proposed action that is carried out without
successfully undermining the purported threat carries a risk to the broader ICTA
legitimacy. Had the U.S. referred its plans for an invasion of Iraq to an ICTA
and received approval, the failure to find weapons of mass destruction would
have destroyed any credibility that the body had.
The ICTA and the UNSC could also involve lengthy deliberation processes.
In the interim and assuming such deliberations were known by the target - al-
most assured in the UNSC and quite possibly with leaks in the ICTA - that actor
could undertake strategic counter-measures to lower the probability of a success-
ful attack. Nearly all practitioners and a majority of analysts can agree that when
contemplating an attack a state must be wary of issuing a signal to potential
targets.6 2 A nuclear weapons state might attempt to harden the sites of the weap-
ons, including placing defenses around a nuclear facility. A terrorist group might
quickly dismantle its training bases, making an approval of a preventive action
moot. Consider the 2007 preventive action taken against a Syrian nuclear reactor
by Israel. Had Israel taken its case before an authorizing body that signal might
have - at a minimum - tipped off Syria to the impending strike. More troubling
however is that the signal issued by Israel would be vague - remember the actual
petition and proceedings would be kept secret. Such a signal might provoke a
cascade of uncertainty and tension in the region. Syria is not alone in posing a
potential threat to the Israeli state.
Ultimately, there is no perfect operating system rule for authorizing Bush Doc-
trine action. Allowing states to be the sole arbiter would allow for widespread
use without delay, but would do little to offset the potential for abuse. Giving
authority to the U.N. Security Council would prevent abuse but limit use. An
international court specifically charged with assessing threat might be shunned
by states in key circumstances.
62 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 284 (noting "surprise" is a fundamental tenet of successful military
operations); see also UNITED STATEs ARmy, FIELD MANUAL 3-0: OPERATIONS, 4-12 (2001).
88 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 9, Issue 1
The Bush Doctrine and the Use of Force
3. Must This Be a Last Resort Option?
Even with clear standards and proper authorization, there is the option of put-
ting additional normative requirements on the Bush Doctrine before preventive
military action could be employed. Conditioning rights on prior behaviors is
common in legal systems - requirements that other solutions or actions must
first be taken before the right in question can be exercised. For example, there
usually needs to be an exhaustion of local remedies before a state can file an
international claim on behalf of one of its citizens or corporations. 6 3 With re-
spect to the Bush Doctrine, the most commonly mentioned condition is that pre-
ventive military action be exercised only as a "last resort." 6 4
The requirement that military force be employed as a last resort is rooted in
the logic that rules of international law should minimize the use of military force
to the greatest extent possible. Hence, U.N. Charter provisions lay out a strict
and general prohibition against the use of force,6 5 and allowances for self-defense
are then only a limited exception to that general prohibition. Restricting military
force to a last resort option also promotes the peaceful resolution of disputes, as
actors are required to try alternative means to deal with disagreements first. This
is no accident because in a system where violent action by a state carries costs far
beyond the battlefield casualties (e.g. economic and societal disruption; creation
of new enmities, etc.), it is in the interest of all states to see if other actions might
first resolve the situation. International legal rules do not specify precisely what
those alternate means might be, but presumably, many of those mentioned in the
U.N. Charter, Chapter VI - mediation, conciliation, adjudication - would be ap-
plicable. 66 Nevertheless, such alternatives might be impractical or inadequate in
the context of terrorist threats from non-state actors. Adjudication is not an op-
tion, given that no legal issues might be involved and non-state actors lack stand-
ing in most international venues. Negotiations are often politically unlikely, as
well as practically impossible given that such groups often lack clear organiza-
tional structures and leadership.
At first glance, a requirement that other peaceful alternatives be tried before
military action is allowed seems like a viable option. By definition, the time until
a threat might be operational necessarily affords the threatened state the opportu-
nity to pursue alternative methods of threat prevention. Yet, there are two
problems unique to imposing last resort requirements on the Bush Doctrine -
those relating to determining when alternatives have been exhausted and bargain-
ing advantages.
If rules require that other alternatives must be pursued before a given action is
permitted, there is the inherent problem of determining when those alternatives
63 See generally Sylvia D'Ascoli & Kathrin Maria Scherr, The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local
Remedies in the International Law Doctrine and its Application in the Specific Context of Human Rights
Protection (EUI Working Paper No. EUI WP LAW 2007/02), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/bit
stream/handle/1 814/6701/LAW_2007_02.pdf?sequence=l.
64 See Anderson, supra note 3, at 272; see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 863.
65 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
66 Id. art. 33-38.
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have been exhausted and, therefore, when the last resort option is in order. The
exhaustion of local remedies for international claims can be determined by exam-
ining whether all legal avenues and appeals have been pursued.6 7 As for the use
of force, the Charter and Caroline standards provide a clear basis for assessing
when peaceful resolution is no longer possible: an armed attack has either oc-
curred or is imminent. Unfortunately, the Bush Doctrine presents special chal-
lenges in this regard. First, unlike exclusively legal options, there are a variety of
peaceful alternatives such as mediation and negotiation that have no identifiable
concluding points. Even if mediation and negotiations fail initially, this does not
preclude their further use to resolve conflict, unlike most legal proceedings; some
conflict management attempts fail, but lay the groundwork for better relations
and ultimate success in the future.6 8 Thus, it might be impossible to assess when
military action is truly the last resort, which provides an opening for a state to
declare an impasse in order to justify military action. Second, and complicating
this problem, is the timing element referenced above in the discussion of threat
thresholds. As the threat might be months or years before the threat is actualized,
there is ample time for additional peaceful overtures. Even with initial failure, in
most cases there would still be substantial time to pursue further alternatives. As
long as time remains and attack is not imminent, one could argue that alternatives
have not been exhausted and therefore preventive military action is not justified.
The second problem involves the bargaining incentives. Bargaining incentives
are relevant if international law accepts the view that the Bush Doctrine autho-
rizes the use of force only as a last resort. If the target actor is negotiating with
its potential attacker, the shadow of a future Bush Doctrine action might lead to
two undesirable consequences. First, the target of a Bush Doctrine action would
likely offer greater concessions to its enemy than might otherwise be the case. If
the target expects costly military action from its opponent, it will settle for less in
present deliberations. This is a bargaining advantage that the potential attacker
can exploit, even if the outcome is not just or the likelihood of preventive mili-
tary action is low. Indeed, if this theory is correct, powerful states are more
likely to invoke the Bush Doctrine in order to benefit from such bargaining ad-
vantages. Second, Bush Doctrine actions are likely to be carried out dispropor-
tionately, or primarily, by more powerful states. 6 9 Thus, giving effect to the
Bush Doctrine but mandating attempts at peaceful remedies secures a bargaining
advantage for the strong versus the weak. Recognizing this, the weaker side
might choose to launch its own attack (assuming it has the capability at that
time), under "better now than never" logic because its best chance to achieve its
67 Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1959 I.C.J. 34 (March 21).
68 JACOB BERCOVITCH & RICHARD JACKSON, CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
46 (2009).
69 See DIEHL & KULKARNI, supra note 4; see also State System Membership List, v2008.1, CORRE-
LATES OF WAR, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2010) (list of major powers varies
by historical era and includes as few as five (US, Soviet Union, China, UK, and France in the 1950s) and
as many as nine (before World War 1) states since 1816); see generally Fearon, supra note 35; see also
Trager, supra note 36, at 347.
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goals might be to carry out its threat rather than wait for either a sub-optimal
negotiated outcome or a military strike by its opponent.
Requiring peaceful alternatives to precede preventive military actions is con-
sistent with the other normative values in the international legal system. The
absence of such a requirement would have pernicious effects in encouraging
states to carry out military actions frequently and perhaps with impunity. Yet, a
last resort requirement is not without some problems when applied to the Bush
Doctrine, as determining whether the standard has been met is inherently diffi-
cult, and it might confer bargaining advantages on stronger states leading to unin-
tended and undesirable consequences.
B. Execution
1. Must the Act Be Exercised Multilaterally or Is Unilateral Action
Permitted?
Normative and operating system rules condition not only the authorization of
certain behaviors, but might also dictate the execution of those behaviors. As-
suming that Bush Doctrine actions are justified and properly authorized, the next
step is to consider what limits might be placed on the actual use of preventive
military actions. Operationally, one key consideration is which actors can exer-
cise the rights granted under a new rule of law. Although this is a legal specifica-
tion, there is also a practical effect of whether the rule privileges certain actors'
abilities to exercise those rights over others. In theory, the Bush Doctrine applies
to all states. Nevertheless, consideration must be given to whether the right to
launch preventive action is limited to unilateral state actions or whether collec-
tive action in response to a common threat or to aid a state that is particularly
threatened is allowed (or even required).
Rules for traditional self-defense embedded in the U.N. Charter allow individ-
ual states to both take defensive actions independently of their allies as well as
take actions assisted by collectives of allies. 70 Incorporating the Bush Doctrine
within the extant operating system would provide for greater continuity in the
legal system. Yet, the question arises whether some modifications should be
made to these arrangements. The first is whether the right might be restricted to
unilateral actions by states, with the exclusion that other states may not partici-
pate in the action unless, of course, they too are directly threatened by potential
aggression from target actors.
By restricting the Bush Doctrine to unilateral actions, the frequency of its use
would be limited to instances in which powerful states have the need and will to
act. De facto, most states lack the necessary intelligence to detect long-term
70 U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security.").
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threats accurately and lack the capacity to project military power across signifi-
cant geographic distances.7 1 This is not to argue that many states cannot take
action at or near their national borders, but rather that regional and global powers
(e.g., U.S., France) are better able to take advantage of a rule. This has the
benefit of reducing overall violence in the international system - a worthy goal -
but as referenced earlier, introduces a problem of legitimacy. It is unlikely that
multilateral treaty negotiations would produce a rule from which only a limited
numbers of states could benefit, and allowing only unilateral action would be
perceived both as institutionalizing hegemonic influence in global affairs and as
incompatible with the principle of the sovereign equality of states. 7 2
Expanding the Bush Doctrine to permit collective action in response to either a
common threat or aid to a threatened state necessarily broadens the range of
instances in which the Bush Doctrine might be invoked. As a result, weaker
states might now call upon allies to assist it in meeting prospective external
threats, just as they may call upon allies when responding to actual attacks. Per-
mitting collective action might also enhance the likelihood of successful execu-
tion of preventive military action as threatened states can call upon the resources
and expertise of others.7 3 Operating system rules should always facilitate the
implementation of norms, not undermine their success. Otherwise, the values
favored by the international community will not be maximized.
On the other end of the continuum, if it makes good legal and practical sense
to permit collective response for the Bush Doctrine, should individual preventive
military action be banned and collective action be a requirement? This could
effectively modify any authorization rule on the Bush Doctrine such that even if
individual states could determine when preventive action is justified, they would
still need to persuade others about the validity and utility of that judgment. This
could confer additional legitimacy on the action. The world witnessed this re-
quirement's haphazard use in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. It was no accident
that the U.S. wanted to engage the largest possible coalition of partners. 7 4 Even
though many of the coalition partners were minimally involved, the time and
effort needed to persuade forty heads of state to lay their reputations on the line
and support the U.S. decision to invade was a significant accomplishment.
As a practical matter, requiring that any state wishing to invoke the Bush Doc-
trine also garner the support of some minimum number of states may serve as a
possible solution to the privacy concerns evoked by negotiations and the strategic
evasion possible with the ICTA; coalition building would apply to any and all
states. At the same time, it would allow a threatened state considering the Bush
Doctrine to secretly discuss its concerns with potential coalition partners - al-
71 See generally DOUGLAS LEMKE, REGIONS OF WAR AND PEACE 67-80 (2002).
72 Richard Steinberg, Who is Sovereign, 40 STAN. J INT'L L. 329, 340 (2004).
73 See DIEHL & KULKARNI, supra note 4 (Multilateral actions are not necessarily more likely to be
successful. An empirical analysis of this point with specific regards to its relevance to the Bush Doctrine
suggest that fewer multilateral actions end in stalemate, but the increased chances of victory are offset by
increased chances of losses).
74 JAMES BAKER & LEE HAMILTON, IRAQ WAR STUDY GROUP REPORT: THE WAY FORWARD - A
NEW APPROACH 310 (2006).
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ready a part of current diplomatic practice. The additional imposition of commit-
ment gathering could act as a screening agent for unreasonable strikes as opposed
to strikes that a reasonably large segment of the international community might
support.
Nevertheless, requiring collective action does not necessarily solve the prob-
lem of privileging powerful states, as these states are still the ones that will nec-
essarily be the part of many coalitions that form in order to carry out military
attacks. Major power states are also the centerpieces of existing alliances, such
as NATO, that are most likely the agents to carry out collective military actions
under the Bush Doctrine.75 Many small states do not have ready access to such
groupings. In addition, many threats will be highly specific to certain countries,
and other states might be unwilling to take action or endorse it because the future
attack does not affect their national interests, leaving individual states bound
under a coalition requirement without any options even if the threat is real and
the prospective damage great.
Given the above discussion, it seems most desirable to have execution rules
for the Bush Doctrine mirror those already in place for traditional self-defense,
namely allowing both individual and collective military action. Restricting the
practice to only individual states or only to coalitions undesirably favors the most
powerful states in the international system and creates other problems, while
yielding minimal advantages over current operating system arrangements.
2. How Do the Laws of War Constrain Doctrine Actions?
When certain actions are sanctioned, rarely (if ever) does this include an un-
limited exercise of rights as limitations on the extent of action or other con-
straints are often already written into the rules. For example, the Law of the Sea
treaty limits the right of "hot pursuit" according to the location of where the
chase began and where it might end as well as how the chase is conducted.76
Thus, another consideration is how the normative precepts of the Bush Doctrine
map with other normative restrictions on the conduct of war and the use of mili-
tary force generally. There are a variety of international rules on the conduct of
war, generally labeled under jus in bello or international humanitarian law.77
Does the Bush Doctrine fit well within those rules or must modifications be
made?
75 NATO carried out actions in Libya and Kosovo. Even as weaker states took the lead on specific
military operations, the major powers within NATO offered the operational support necessary for suc-
cessful completion of particular military actions and a sustained presence in the region.
76 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, § VII, art. 111, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3
("The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent authorities of the coastal State
have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit
must be commenced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within the internal waters, the archipe-
lagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued
outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been interrupted."); see also G.
Bruce Knecht, Hooked: Pirates, Poaching, and the Perfect Fish 1-4 (2006).
77 YORAM DINsTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 27-52 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining and listing applicable rules).
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For the most part, the Bush Doctrine can accommodate existing rules on the
conduct of war. International rules on the treatment of the wounded, sick, and
prisoners of war78 seem no less applicable to preventive military action than
when military force is employed in other contexts. Similarly, the protection of
civilians from harm has no unique meaning in the context of Bush Doctrine ac-
tions. Preventive action will presumably be designed to degrade or destroy mili-
tary capabilities and civilian targets will not be part of that equation. We
recognize that terrorist bases, weapons stockpiles, or nuclear plants might be lo-
cated near or in civilian populated areas, but these are already concerns for con-
ventional uses of military force and the Bush Doctrine presents no special case. 79
Finally, limitations on the kind of weapons (e.g., chemical weapons) work well
when preventive military action is envisioned so there is no need to loosen or
modify such restrictions.
The one possible exception to the compatibility of the laws of war and the
Bush Doctrine is with respect to proportionality. Conventional rules on propor-
tionality dictate that a state's response or action be roughly equal in terms of
severity to that of the original offense.80 In the context of an armed attack, a state
can only use military means to the extent necessary to defend itself. With respect
to the old customary law of retaliation, the aggrieved party must only respond
with military force roughly equivalent to what was done to it, reflecting the bibli-
cal standard of "an eye for an eye."8" It has been suggested that the Bush Doc-
trine be similarly constrained. 82 Nevertheless, the concept of proportionality is
strained when applied to a future attack rather than an actual attack.
It is not clear how one would calculate proportionality given that no attack has
occurred and any estimate of what damage an attack might precipitate could be
highly speculative. 83 States would be tempted to adopt a risk-adverse posture,
and therefore use what might be considered excess force in retrospect in order to
insure that any threat is eliminated. However, if the Bush Doctrine is confined to
78 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T,S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Convention [No. 1] for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention [No. 2] for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention [No. 3]
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention [No. 4]
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
79 Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF THE
U.N. (April 7, 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrcouncillspecialsession/9/docs/UNFFMGC
.Report.pdf (Goldstone report issued by the United Nations Human Rights Council found that in order to
disincentivize strikes by Israel, members of Hamas would intentionally stockpile weapons in schools,
hospitals and other areas of heavy population).
80 JurrH GARDHAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE 8-28, 59 (2004).
81 See Edward Kwakwa, Belligerent Reprisals in the Law ofArmed Conflict, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L.,
49-81 (1990).
82 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 861-62.
83 MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE "GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR" 39 (2007).
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situations involving weapons of mass destruction and other catastrophic risks, the
proportionality requirement for use of force is more easily determined and satis-
fied. Any military action to destroy weapons of mass destruction would presum-
ably have fewer negative consequences (e.g., less destruction, fewer lives lost)
than an attack using those weapons. Thus, preventive strikes would not produce
a disproportionate action, but indeed lead to more limited uses of military force
than would otherwise be the case.
Overall, the Bush Doctrine does not appear to necessitate new normative rules
for the conduct of military action, and with the possible exception of proportion-
ality standards, is easily accommodated within the existing framework of interna-
tional law.
C. Enforcement - What Mechanisms Exist for Ensuring Compliance/
Enforcement and to Punish Violations?
Provisions designed to enhance compliance with the rules, monitor the prac-
tice of those rules, and provide mechanisms for redressing violations of those
rules must accompany all legal rules. Do existing operating system mechanisms,
such as the U. N. Security Council and various international courts, suitably play
these roles with respect to the Bush Doctrine? If not, what new operating system
structures might be necessary?
Although there are benefits to adherence to international law for its own sake,
this is not always a sufficient incentive for states.84 In the cases in which states
might not adhere to laws without added incentives, compliance mechanisms are
necessary. In the case of the Bush Doctrine, there would be incentives to use
military force to achieve policy goals, and a new rule could provide political and
legal cover for such unintended consequences. There are two potential hurdles to
enforcing any rule successfully: detecting violations (monitoring) and then pun-
ishing them.85 Various types of compliance mechanisms exist. Various sanc-
tions commonly used in international politics give states that have been victims
of non-compliance the option of retorsion (or the adoption of an "unfriendly and
harmful act" that is still legal but is in retaliation against injurious acts of other
parties).8 6 In addition, legal rules could require violators to pay punitive dam-
ages. In the absence of any direct action, there is always the loss of reputation
faced by states that violate law. However, each potential mechanism to enforce
proper use of the Bush Doctrine has its own set of challenges.
Should the Bush Doctrine become law, the primary source of abuse would be
in states engaging in wars for reasons other than self-defense. Depending on the
authorization standards created, going to war before it was cleared by the rele-
vant international body would also be a type of non-compliance. Although states
84 See generally A Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF.
L. REv. 1823 (2002).
85 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes,
42 INT'L. STUD. Q. 109, 122 (1998) (discussing information supply); see also Xinyuan Dai, Information
Systems in Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405, 412 (2002) (discussing noncompliance).
86 SHAw, supra note 22, at 1101.
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have obligations not to threaten others,87 the Bush Doctrine itself is the solution
to providing punishment to those states. Additionally, the Bush Doctrine does
not create a legal obligation to intervene, and therefore states cannot be held
responsible for failing to act. Thus, the only way a state could violate the Bush
Doctrine would be to engage in a conflict that did not meet the standards for
anticipatory self-defense.88
Monitoring military action itself is unlikely to be a major problem in enforcing
the Bush Doctrine. Military action tends to be highly transparent, and in most
cases, the source of the action is not difficult to identify. Nevertheless, should
states engage in more clandestine actions, such as the alleged cyber-attacks on
Iran's nuclear facilities by the U.S. and Israel, 9 monitoring might become a
greater problem. Additionally, consideration must be given to the fact that if the
punishment for violating the Bush Doctrine were to increase, states would then
possess greater incentives to engage in even more clandestine actions (e.g. cyber
hacking, special operations raids) than they currently do. Increasing the punish-
ment of violating the Bush Doctrine will likely increase the propensity of states
to violate it as well. In an environment of increased punishment for Bush Doc-
trine violations, the attractiveness of victims claiming violations would also in-
crease. Of course, this line of thought presumes that suitable mechanisms exist
for managing disputes over Bush Doctrine actions and rendering appropriate de-
cisions on their legality.
International courts would be the logical forums for determining the legality of
purported Bush Doctrine actions. In many ways, courts assessing violations
would make many of the same judgments as the ICTA, but in a post hoc fashion.
The tallest hurdle for international court action is state consent. The court most
likely to hear such cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) lacks jurisdic-
tion in many cases because of limits imposed by state consent. Few states (ap-
proximately 66 out of 191) have agreed to accept the optional clause authorizing
the ICJ to hear cases automatically without reservations. 90 As a result of requir-
ing state consent for a majority of states, the number of cases that the ICJ could
hear would be limited. In general, any state expecting a decision rendered
against their interest would likely refuse to submit the case to ICJ jurisdiction or
accept jurisdiction if action was brought against it. Although states could volun-
tarily submit their cases to the ICJ, it is exceedingly unlikely that states would
submit matters involving national security to the ICJ or any other international
court. This unwillingness is further evidenced by the U.S.'s withdrawal from the
87 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
88 In a previous section on authorization, the potential means by which non-compliance would be
determined have already been discussed, but the key aspect of this section is the punishment that would
be given to these violators.
89 No government has officially acknowledged responsibility for the cyberworm Stuxnet, a worm
specifically designed to target Iran's nuclear facilities. See Ed Barnes, Mystery Surrounds Cyber Missile
That Crippled Iran's Nuclear Weapons Ambitions, Fox NEws, April 11, 2011, http://www.foxnews.com/
scitech/2010/11/26/secret-agent-crippled-irans-nuclear-ambitions/ (explaining the cyberworm).
90 Jurisdiction: Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, Ir'L COURT
OF JUSTICE (April 7, 2011), http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?pl=5&p2=1&p3=3.
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optional clause following the ICJ's 1984 ruling in The Republic of Nicaragua v.
The United States of America.91 Given that the U.S. is the originator of the Bush
Doctrine, it is likely that the U.S. would be a state that would commonly want to
invoke it. Many other major powers that might invoke the Bush Doctrine, such
as China, France and Russia, similarly have not accepted the ICJ's optional
clause without reservation. Many potential rogue states, ones that, according to
Delahunty and Yoo are the likely targets of the Bush Doctrine, have also not
accepted the optional clause. 9 2 As has been demonstrated by the Case of Certain
Norwegian Loans,93 the reciprocity clause in state acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction
allows accused states to use the reservations of other states.
Even as the ICJ is the primary court dealing with states, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) also represents a potential venue for punishing individuals
who commit international crimes in the course of Bush Doctrine actions. Yet,
the ICC is unlikely to be a frequent venue for dealing with violations of the Bush
Doctrine. First, its jurisdiction is limited to a narrow set of war crimes, 94 Most Of
which are not frequent occurrences in interstate conflict. Most ICC investiga-
tions thus far have focused on civil wars, not military strikes across state borders.
Of course, there is potential for this to change if the ICC adds aggression to its
list of crimes as has been proposed. 9 5 Second, and beyond jurisdictional limita-
tions imposed by its statute, 9 6 the ICC suffers consent problems similar to those
of the ICJ. In contrast to the ICJ, the ICC lacks an optional clause and does not
offer reservations to the acceptance of the ICC and has yet to win universal ac-
ceptance. Despite 114 states having joined the body,97 most major powers, in-
cluding the U.S., China and Russia, have not acceded to the ICC nor have the
91 Case concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 160 (June 27).
92 Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 3, at 862-63.
93 Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), 1957 I.C.J. 57, 16 (July 6).
94 Crimes covered by the international court include genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity
and crimes against United Nations and associated personnel. Adding the crime of aggression has been
considerably controversial and strongly opposed by the United States and Russia, among other great
powers (many of which have showed their opposition despite not being members of the ICC).
95 See Anja Seibert-Forh, The Crime of Aggression: Adding a Definition to the Rome Statue of the
ICC, 12 ASIL INsIGHTs 24, para. 3-5 (2008), available at http://www.asil.org/insights081t18.cfm (for
more on the debate over the issue of adding aggression to the list of crimes covered by the ICC); since
the publication of the article, there has been some progress, but it is still unlikely to see any prosecution
for the crime of aggression until 2017 at the earliest, and even then, there are likely to be considerable
limitations; see also Karen Allen, The International Criminal Court Needs More Than Time, BBC NEWS,
June 4, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10241421, for a more recent, but non-scholarly source.
96 The ICC has complementary jurisdiction over cases, meaning that the ICC will not act in cases
where a municipal or other court is already trying the case. Additionally, the ICC can only prosecute
cases committed by a national of a state that has accepted the court's jurisdiction, cases that were com-
mitted on the territory of a member, or a case that has been referred to the ICC by the Security Council.
Additionally, while not particularly problematic for the prosecution of crimes into the future, the ICC
cannot prosecute crimes that occurred before July 1, 2002.
97 As of September 22, 2011, there were 139 signatories and 118 members. Full list of members is
available at Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION (Sept. 10,
2011, 7:02:55 EST PM), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=
XVIII-l0&chapter=18&lang=en; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 3.
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majority of Middle Eastern states (Jordan being the only exception). Finally,
there are issues of institutional capacity that limit the ICC's ability to be effec-
tive. Given the size of the ICC prosecutor's office, 98 the ICC can only afford to
go after the most egregious violators of international law.
If there is some determination that a violation has occurred, the final phase of
enforcement is punishing the violator. The absence of a punishment phase could
render much of the previous enforcement elements useless as states could exceed
Bush Doctrine limitations with impunity. Three potential considerations must be
taken into account when considering potential mechanisms for punishment.
First, how feasible is it that a punishment could be delivered successfully? Sec-
ond, if a punishment could be issued, would issuing that punishment do more
good than harm? Finally, could the punishment serve as an effective deterrent to
other violations? Four types of compliance mechanisms in particular are dis-
cussed below: sanctions, reprisals, punitive damages, and reputational costs.
Economic sanctions are a common form of punishment in the international
system and could potentially be imposed on states that violate Bush Doctrine
conditions.9 9 States that fail to gain clearance before taking action under the
Bush Doctrine could be sanctioned, and states that go to war without following
Bush Doctrine criteria might be similarly punished. A key problem with sanc-
tions, however, is securing the approval of other states to comply with them. At
the very least, it seems unlikely that a violator's allies would agree to sanction
the state.100 Other states with important trade ties will also be reluctant to engage
in sanctions,10' and such trade ties are particularly likely among the types of
major powers that are most likely to abuse the Bush Doctrine. As a result, sanc-
tions have generally not been effective as a means of coercion, especially when
used to dissuade states in security matters.
Additionally, the issue of whether sanctions would achieve their entire goal
could also damage the willingness of states to support using sanctions. For ex-
98 As of January 2009, the entire staff at the ICC is 587, not all of who work in the Prosecutor's
Office. Frequently Asked Questions: How Many People Word for the ICC?, INT'L CRIM. COURT (Oct.
19, 2011, 4:25:34 EST PM), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NetApp/App/MCMSTemplates/Index.aspx?NR
MODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7bD788E44D-E29246Al-89CC-DO3637A52766%7d&NR
ORIGINALURL+Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/Frequently+asked+Questions/&NRCACHEHINT=
Guest#id_12.
99 See Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby & Detlef F. Sprinz, When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?,
57 WORLD POL. 479, 499 (2005) (on the use of sanctions and their effectiveness); see also Adrian U-Jin
Ang & Dursun Peksen, When Do Economic Sanctions Work? Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience,
and Outcomes, 60 POL. RES. Q. 135, 143 (2007); see also INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS
AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM (Peter Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
100 See Dan G. Cox & A. Cooper Drury, Democratic Sanctions: Connecting the Democratic Peace
and Economic Sanctions, 43 J. OF PEACE RES. 709, 719 (2006) (analyzing data from 1978 to 2000,
finding that states tend not to sanction allies, though the United States is an exception to this rule); see
also Bryan R. Early, Sleeping with Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade,
53 INT'L STUD. Q. 49, 67-68 (2009) (analysis of 77 instances of sanctions from 1950 to 1990 also finds
that allies will undermine the sanctions placed by their partners).
101 David Lektzian & Mark Souva, An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success, 51 J. OF
CONFIcT RESOL. 848, 854-56 (2007). Nevertheless, trade is only likely to discourage sanctions when
both states are equally dependent on it, as is the case with many of the trade relations among the great
powers.
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ample, consider that the Iraq War started in 2003. After the initial attack on Iraq
by the U.S., the U.S. engaged in a lengthy process to build a democratic regime
within the country. Placing sanctions on the U.S. would have hurt its ability to
engage in regime building, thereby hurting the victim of the violation as much or
more than the perpetrator. Additionally, many opponents of the Iraq War, once
the war had begun, preferred that democracy building efforts were successful.
Notably, many states that did not support the initial war such as the Netherlands
and Denmark were later willing to support reconstruction efforts in Iraq.102 Re-
search on the subject of sanctions generally shows that they are of limited effec-
tiveness. Even one of the more optimistic empirical analyses on the effectiveness
of sanctions examined all the sanctions cases between 1914 and 1990 and found
that they generally had to be used in accompaniment with other tools of statecraft
in order to be successful.' 03 Nevertheless, Robert Pape examined 40 of the 115
cases of sanctions that were deemed successful and argued that only five of these
cases were unqualified successes. 104 Other research has qualified the effective-
ness of sanctions based on regime type, suggesting only democracies would be
responsive to sanctions.105 Finally, it has been suggested that if sanctions are
going to be effective it will only be as threats because any actualization of sanc-
tions means that their "threat" has already failed.' 06
Retorsion represents another potential means of sanction for violations. Retor-
sion is a proportionate military action taken by a state in response to an illegal
military action. 0 7 This is similar to remedies offered by the World Trade Organ-
ization in which states that are victims of trade treaty violations are authorized to
take punitive action against violating states in proportion to the original of-
fense. 08 The likelihood that retorsion could be undertaken is stronger than sanc-
tions because a reprisal only requires action from the victim of a violation, not
the international community at large. Nevertheless, a retorsion by a weaker state
may not be possible if it is not allowed to draw upon the resources of allies.
Indeed, the preventive military action might have destroyed a capacity to re-
spond. In addition, allowing retorsion seems to make little sense if terrorist
groups were the targets of Bush Doctrine actions. One would not want to permit
such groups to carry out retorsion, and the state on whose territory the preventive
action occurred might be unwilling or unable (in the case of a failed state) to
launch a retaliatory strike. In any case, retorsion runs counter to the international
community's preference for minimizing the use of military force.
102 Some states also helped the United States indirectly by helping in Afghanistan. States such as
Canada and France opposed the Iraq war but continued to support US efforts in Afghanistan, allowing the
United States greater flexibility.
103 GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, JEFFREY J. SCHOrr & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOT, EcoNoMic SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED 91-93 (2nd ed. rev. 1990).
104 Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT'L SEC. 90, 105 (1997).
105 Lektzian & Souva, supra at note 101, at 849.
106 Dean Lacy & Emerson M.S. Niou, A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage. The Roles
of Preferences, Information and Threats, 66 J. OF POL. 25, 38 (2004).
107 SHAW, supra note 22, at 1128,
108 World Trade Org., supra note 28, para. 3-4.
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Punitive damages are equally hard to apply and could be difficult to enforce.
Given that the state engaging in the violation is likely to consider its actions
justified, further compliance mechanisms would need to be put in place to insure
the state actually paid the damages. Punitive damages are unlikely to deter a
state on an issue that the state perceives to be one of key national security. Ac-
cording to economists Joe Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes, the Iraq War would cost the
U.S. three trillion dollars.10 9 If punitive damages were commensurate to the
U.S.'s initial action (excluding any damages that occurred after the U.S. were
invited by the new Iraqi government), it is unlikely that amount would be nearly
as significant as what the U.S. was willing to spend on the war. In such cases, it
is difficult to see how punitive damages would effectively dissuade a state, even
if they could be assessed successfully.
Finally, there are reputational costs suffered by states that violate international
law. Reputational costs are the losses that a state suffers in its global reputation
as a result of violating international law.I 10 Reputational costs are not difficult to
enforce, as they occur immediately once a state violates international law. There
are no costs to international peace by a state losing reputation. Under previous
rules regarding the use of force, however, the reputational losses have not been a
sufficient deterrent to prevent states from engaging in illegal acts of aggres-
sion,"' so it is unlikely that reputational losses would be a sufficient deterrent
under a Bush Doctrine.
V. Conclusion
The Bush Doctrine is a much-debated proposal to give legal standing for states
to use military force in a preventive fashion against future threats. Heretofore,
most of the discussion has been over its effectiveness, morality, and other con-
cerns. Yet, the Bush Doctrine at this stage is little more than a series of general
precepts and political statements. To become part of the international legal sys-
tem, there needs to be much greater specification of the Doctrine, including what
we have termed operating and normative system rules. The former deals with the
109 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BLIMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE TRUE COST
OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 24-31 (2008) for a description of the costs of the Iraq war. As of 2007, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) listed lower estimates of the costs of the Iraq war as $604 billion
and projected that depending on different scenarios, it would cost an additional 570 to 1,055 billion
dollars. See Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other Activities Related
to the War on Terrorism: Statement before the Comm. on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives,
I10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Peter Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. and Budget), available at
http://usgovinfo.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.cbo.gov/.
110 See Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Reputation and Interstate Conflict, 51 Am. J. OF POL. Sa. 382, 394
(2007) (on how damaged reputations can lead to more conflict for the states who have suffered them); see
MICHAEL TOMz, REPUTATION AND INT' L COOPERATION 239-41 (2007) (reputation also applies to other
areas of international relations, such as international finance).
III Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979 is an example of a case where a state willingly sacrificed
reputation for an issue of national security. Vietnam invaded Cambodia and as a result ended the genoci-
dal reign of Pol Pot. However, knowing that ending the conflict under said justification would be legally
insufficient, Vietnam did not offer that argument in their defense and was sanctioned by the United
Nations. See Martha Finnemore, Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention in THE CULTURE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 179-80 (Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., 1996).
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application and management of international law whereas the latter provide de-
tails on the acceptable behaviors. This article examined the various legal choices
available with respect to the authorization, execution, and enforcement of preven-
tive military action under the Bush Doctrine.
Various aspects of the Bush Doctrine fit easily within extant international legal
system rules, but in several cases, there are various tradeoffs present in defining
Bush Doctrine rules, always resulting in various costs no matter what options are
selected. The fewest costs would seem to accrue if Bush Doctrine actions were
limited to threats involving mass or extensive destruction, including catastrophic
risks. Yet, the problem of specifying how far in advance preventive military
action should be permitted seems insoluble. Allowing attacks well in advance of
prospective threats would encourage frequent mistakes and escalating conflict
when other, peaceful means might have been pursued. Permitting actions when
threats are imminent obviates the utility of a Bush Doctrine and might be handled
under some standard applications of the international law of self-defense.
Making states exhaust peaceful means of conflict resolution before launching
an attack ("last resort") appears superior to alternatives that would promote more
violence, but the problems of determining when other means are no longer viable
and granting bargaining advantages to stronger states remains. Leaving decisions
to launch Bush Doctrine actions to state authority will promote widespread and
improper use, but avoid delays in execution that might undermine effectiveness.
The reverse is encountered with giving authority to the U.N. Security Council -
abuse is less likely, but at the cost of significant and potentially crippling delay.
An international court specifically charged with assessing threats raises problems
with secrecy and legitimacy that do not make it a viable alternative.
The execution of Bush Doctrine actions seems to be accommodated well by
existing international legal rules. Permitting unilateral and collective actions pro-
vides maximum flexibility for threatened states and does not handicap smaller
states from exercising new legal rights to use military force. Similarly, current
international laws on armed conflict involving protection of civilians and use of
certain weapons are not inherently compromised. Any problems in specifying a
proportionality standard can be redressed by only allowing Bush Doctrine actions
to respond to threats involving high levels of prospective destruction such as
those from the use of weapons of mass destruction. More problematic are con-
structing rules for detecting Bush Doctrine violations and punishing those re-
sponsible. The records of the U.N. Security Council and international courts are
not encouraging in this regard, but there does not seem to be superior alternatives
that would overcome the political and other difficulties associated with those
institutions.
The changing character of security threats (terrorism, weapons of mass de-
struction) raises important questions about the suitability of current international
rules to address them. Incorporating the Bush Doctrine into international law has
been suggested as one solution. Yet, our analysis reveals that its utility varies
according to a series of rule choices about preventive military action, but in no
case is the Bush Doctrine a panacea to solve all problems nor, even at its best, is
the Bush Doctrine without significant problems in application.
Volume 9, Issue 1 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review 101
